System-wide propagation is frequently observed in malware, and there are several resources, like blog posts and similar, that detail some of the techniques used. However, there is currently no thorough study on the subject at large, and the full extent of system-wide malware propagation remains unknown. In this paper, we perform a systematic study on many real-world samples to comprehensively characterise system-wide propagation within the malware landscape and the goal is to use detailed and precise analyses to derive high-level views. We achieve this by collecting a diverse set of malware samples, analyse them in our Minerva malware analysis framework and then extract vast amounts of statistics about the results. We use these results to provide an in-depth discussion centred on four main research questions.
INTRODUCTION
e number of malware samples we discover continues to grow year by year and the ability to automatically analyse these threats is a critical part of our defense.
e underpinnings of malware analysis can broadly be categorised in the two broad categories of static and dynamic analysis. Static analysis analyses the malware without executing it and dynamic analysis relies on executing the given sample. Dynamic analysis is typically performed by way of a malware sandbox, i.e. by executing the sample in an isolated and dedicated environment usually based on some form of virtualisation.
e popularity of malware sandboxes have grown signi cantly in the last decade [1, 6, 14, 17, 25, 29, 35] and they are a ractive because they allow precise analysis of concrete malware executions, which can be used to circumvent various obfuscation and packing techniques that are typically deployed by the malware.
However, malware o en comes with several capabilities in order to avoid dynamic analysis and in recent years the concept of evasive malware has been a popular technique for malware authors. One particular technique adopted by malware is the concept of system-wide malware execution. is refers to malware executing throughout the entire system by way of multi-process propagation, code injection, code-reuse a acks and alike. In essence, this form of execution paradigm complicates the task of precisely capturing the malware execution since the malware may execute in stealthy ways, e.g. within the execution-context of otherwise benign processes.
e academic community has responded and made several e orts into studying the problem [2-4, 20, 22, 25] .
Although system-wide malware propagation has received a ention from the academic community, there are currently no comprehensive studies on the subject and the scope of the problem at large remains unknown. Most resources are anecdotal examples of code injection techniques [16, 27] and blog posts by anti-malware researchers [7, 18] , and these mainly present results based on manual analysis of speci c samples. is is an important missing gap of knowledge since systematic studies of large malware data sets are essential for anti-malware research. We rely on these studies to systematise our knowledge, design new experiments that verify our techniques and to explore new research avenues.
In this paper, we aim to ll this gap by performing the rst large-scale systematic study of system-wide malware propagation. To this end, we build a comprehensive statistics component into the Minerva malware analysis sandbox presented [24] and then use our framework to analyse and characterise a large and diverse set of malware samples. Our study is focused on three aspects of system-wide propagation. First, to understand the prevalence and diversity of system-wide malware propagation. Second, to understand the relationship between system-wide malware propagation and malicious activities. ird, to understand system-wide malware propagation evolution over time and inter-family characteristics of malware propagation strategy.
To reason about system-wide malware executions at large, we de ne the concept of a system-wide control-ow graph, which is a data structure that describes the entire system-wide malware execution. E ectively, this data structure combines the ability to identify multi-process execution [25] and capture execution waves [24] to give a complete overview of a given malware propagation.
We perform our study with a comprehensive set of malware samples that re ects a diverse and broad view of malware in the wild.
e data set we collect has samples from many di erent families, many di erent malware types and samples that were discovered over a seven-year time-frame. In addition to this, our data set is completely balanced in terms of samples per family so as to avoid biases in the results.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose the concept of a system-wide control ow graph which captures intrinsic aspects of malware propagation in a given sample.
• We collect a data set with a broad range of malware samples that were discovered across the last seven years.
• We implement a comprehensive and rigorous statistics component that interprets the results of Minerva.
• We characterise system-wide malware propagation through a detailed and thorough study of the malware samples by analysing them in Minerva and gathering many di erent and insightful statistics.
MINERVA BACKGROUND
e work we present in this paper uses our malware analysis system Minerva described in earlier work [24] . In order to make this paper self-contained we will brie y cover in this section the core techniques that Minerva uses to analyse malware which are relevant for this paper.
Minerva traces the malware execution based on dynamic taint analysis so as to capture the malware execution throughout the entire system and the speci c purpose is to monitor malware execution in the context of multi-process propagation. In short, Minerva taints the malware when it is loaded into memory, including both code and data sections of the malware module, and then considers malware execution to be each instruction executed on the system that is made up of tainted memory. Furthermore, the output of each tainted instruction is also tainted, so as to capture dynamically generated code by the malware. In this way, Minerva captures malware execution without any hooks on common APIs for process propagation, e.g. CreateRemoteThread. is speci c approachin Minerva was adopted from Tartarus [25] .
In addition to capturing system-wide malware execution, Minerva also captures dynamically generated code by the malware using an information-ow model. is is used for automatic unpacking and capturing of shellcode, and the key idea behind the information-ow approach is to capture dynamically generated code independently of who wrote the code. Speci cally, it is o en the case that malware will force benign code to create dynamically generated code on its behalf, and the information-ow model will capture this, contrary to the models of dynamically generated code used in many traditional unpackers that only capture dynamically generated code explicitly by the malware [9, 12, 21, 23] . In this paper, we call each wave of dynamically generated code an "execution wave".
Minerva is built on top of the QEMU [8] full-system emulator and, more speci cally, Minerva relies on the PANDA [13] framework. In this paper we have made minimal additions to Minerva, however, we have built a large statistics-framework around the system that allows us to use the precise malware analysis o ered by Minerva to extract large amounts of data.
SYSTEM-WIDE PROPAGATION GRAPH
In this section, we introduce the concept of a system-wide propagation graph (SPG). Intuitively, SPG combines the output of Minerva into one single data structure. is data structure, thus, captures intrinsic aspects of host-based malware propagation in terms of multi-process execution and dynamically generated code. Informally, the SPG is a directed graph where the nodes constitute execution waves, and the edges constitute transitions from one execution wave to another. Each node then contains meta information to capture useful properties, such as their particular process. Formally, the SPG is described as follows.
De nition 1. A system-wide propagation graph is a 3-tuple, SPG=(V, E,ˆ ), where G=(V, E) is a directed weakly-connected graph such that each node is an execution wave, each edge is a control-ow transition, andˆ ∈ V is the entry point.
To capture the SPG in practice, we must be able to identify all of the execution waves and the corresponding control-ow transitions for a given malware sample. Minerva already supports capturing execution waves and identifying control-ow transitions between execution waves across processes (adopted from Tartarus [25] ), however, to capture control-ow transitions from waves internally within a process, we make an edge from the last instruction executed before the entry of a new execution wave.
To reason quantitatively about malware propagation we build several de nitions on the SPG and the general idea is to describe malware propagation techniques in more ways than only counting the number of processes and the number of waves. We give insights about the malware propagation topology by creating two de nitions that capture the maximum depth of processes and waves and one de nition that describes the width of the SPG.
De nition 2. Given an SPG, G=(V, E,ˆ ), the process-depth of PD(G) is the maximum number of di erent processes visited amongst all non-cyclic path through G, starting fromˆ .
De nition 3. Given an SPG, G=(V, E,ˆ ), the wave-depth WD(G) is the size of the longest non-cyclic path through G, starting fromˆ .
De nition 4.
Given an SPG, G=(V, E,ˆ ), the SPG-width |G | is the maximum number of non-cyclic paths from the entry-pointˆ to all of the leaf nodes in the graph.
Notice that De nition 2 and De nition 3 are di erent from calculating the total number of processes and waves, respectively. e notion of depth in the malware execution is relevant because it encapsulates how deep into the malware execution a manual malware analyst must go before reaching the end of an injection/unpacking sequence, for example, in a debugger.
e notion of SPG-width given in De nition 4 aims to capture how broadly malware executes on a system, and, therefore, describes the number of execution paths in the malware propagation rather than how deep they are.
Example of system-wide propagation graph
To illustrate system-wide propagation graphs, as well as processdepth, wave-depth and SPG-width, we show the SPG of a malware sample from the Tinba family in Figure 1 . e sample initially creates one wave of dynamically generated code in its initial process and then launches a new process of the otherwise benign Windows application winver.exe. e malware injects code into the launched winver.exe process and the code in winver.exe further creates another wave of dynamically generated code. e second wave in winver.exe injects code into the otherwise benign Windows process explorer.exe and inside this process, the malware proceeds to inject code into ve other processes on the system. e process-depth of the SPG is four, the wave-depth is six, and the SPG-width is ve.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We now elaborate on the methodology for our large-scale empirical study. Speci cally, we outline our data set, our research questions and also describe our experimental setup, including false-positive removal. 
Data collection
e goal of our data collection is to establish a set of samples that broadly represents the Windows malware landscape over several years. To this end, we have collected samples from various kinds of malware, a diverse set of families and from an extended timeline. We identify the year a sample is from as the year the sample was rst submi ed to VirusTotal. In contrast to other quantitative largescale studies [5, 33] that analyse tens and hundreds of thousands of malware samples, we instead keep the total samples in our data set comparatively low and comprehensible but with a wide distribution of malware families. is is because samples within the same family tend to behave similarly [28] , and by keeping the numbers low, we enable more investigations to understand and verify results at a detailed and complete level.
Most of the samples in our data set are collected from kernelmode-.info, VirusTotal, and a few are from virusshare.com, contagiodump.com and Malpedia [28] . To ensure that we had no benign samples we required each sample to be detected by at least 13 anti-malware vendors and to ensure consistency of the samples belonging to a given malware family we required for each sample that at least two vendors label it within the same malware family. Table 1: e malware families that we used for our study. We used 10 samples from each family.
On average each sample had 51 anti-malware vendors report it as malicious and a median of 53.
Our data set contains 65 di erent malware families with ten samples from each family, making a total of 650 samples. Table 1 shows the speci c families and the years their samples were rst discovered, and Figure 2 shows the yearly-distribution of when samples were rst discovered. Our data set has samples spanning 2012-2018 and Figure 3 shows the number of families represented each year. We have an average of 22 families represented each year, with a maximum of 33 families in 2014 and a minimum of 19 families in 2012.
Research questions
e goal of our study is to characterise malware propagation at large and to do this, we propose four high level research questions.
(1) Is system-wide malware propagation prevalent? e goal of this research question is to give quantitative measurements of the basic characteristics of malware propagation at large. To answer this, we gather statistics on the number of processes and execution waves in each malware sample and also the depths and width of the SPG. processes are the targets of malware propagation, (2) which speci c techniques are used for malware propagation and (3) the proportion of droppers versus code injections. (3) Are there clear relations between malicious behaviour and system-wide malware propagation? e goal of this research question is to identify how malware performs its malicious behaviours, e.g. achieves persistence, escalates process-level privileges or connects back to its C&C server, relative to its system-wide propagation strategy. To answer this question, we investigate where in the SPG malware: (1) uses dynamically generated code, (2) executes most of its code and (3) performs sensitive API calls.
(4) Has system-wide malware executions changed consistently towards one direction and are there any clear inter-family SPG consistency? e goal of this research question is to measure if malware propagation has changed over time and if samples from the same family propagate similarly. To answer this question, we gather statistics based on grouping our data set into the years the samples were rst observed and also do family-oriented statistics.
Experimental set up
We conduct all of our experiments on a 4-core Intel-7 CPU with 4.2 GHz and a Windows 7, 32-bit guest architecture. e guest is in a closed network and connected to another virtual machine that performs network simulation using InetSim [19] . As such, malware samples that connect back to some C&C server will be able to resolve DNS names, connect to every IP and also receive content. However, the content itself is the default data provided by INetSim, which will hinder malware samples from ge ing C&C-speci c data, e.g. bot commands. We set a recording time of 25 seconds and a lo of 120 minutes for replaying. Due to the resources required to run this type of experiment, we analysed each sample once.
e applications on the guest machine were executed with a local admin account and with User Account Control (UAC) enabled. We perform no user stimulation during the analysis, and no applications were running in the guest system apart from the generic Windows processes. To start execution of a given sample, we mount it as an .iso le in QEMU and then send keystrokes to QEMU to execute command-line commands in the guest's terminal for opening the mounted .iso and starting the sample.
Generating multi-process signatures
e goal of our study is to give a precise view of system-wide propagation and we need to ensure we distinguish malware samples that use di erent multi-process propagation techniques, while simultaneously identifying samples that rely on the same technique. To this end, we use the output of Minerva to highlight multi-process propagation and then manually re ne this information into easily recognisable signatures. We use the precise API capture of Minerva, the system-wide malware execution trace and identi cation of intrinsic aspects in multi-process transitions to speed up the reverse engineering process signi cantly. We started our study with no signatures and then incrementally created signatures for each analysed sample.
False positive and false negative elimination
Minerva may over-taint the system and include benign code in the malware execution trace. To elegantly solve this issue, we introduce a heuristic that identi es over-tainting in order to eliminate false positives.
To identify over-tainting, we rst check for each sample with multi-process execution if any of our generated signatures recognise the multi-process transitions. If there are some processes with malicious execution but no matching signature, then we consider this process a potential case of over-tainting. We determine this by matching the tainted code with code that was present in the system before the malware execution. e idea is that if the code execution is due to over-tainting, it must be part of the non-malware code and, therefore, part of the original code as it was before the malware execution. We verify this in practice by matching API calls observed by Minerva and the API calls performed by the potentially benign code. If we nd more than 99.00% of the API calls from the tainted code correspond to API calls in the existing Windows code or if the tainted code has no API calls in the process at all then we declare the process a false-positive. Otherwise, we consider it a true positive and reverse engineer the code in order to create a signature. e reason we maintain a 99% threshold is to allow for incompleteness in our ability to extract API calls statically from the Windows code and Minerva does this as part of our static analysis post dynamic analysis. So far we have not found any false positives from this approach.
Finally, PANDA itself may fail in some instances and only replay li le of the recorded execution. To deal with samples that did not execute properly, we remove all samples with less than 25 di erent instructions executed on the system.
All of the statistics we report in this paper are post false-positive elimination, including the input data set described in 4.1. As such, we have manually veri ed multi-process execution for all samples in our data set as a result of our signature creation. e numbers we report are, therefore, a strict lower-bound, but we may miss out on some aspects of the malware capabilities due to the nature of dynamic analysis. Although a strict lower-bound, we consider it a precise estimate, and o en signi cantly more accurate in comparison to other work, as justi ed by the work described in [24] .
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our study in terms of the four research questions described above. is section focuses on a quantitative presentation and then in Section 6, we give an interpretation and qualitative discussion of the results.
antitative measurements
We now present results related to our rst research question "Is system-wide malware propagation prevalent?" by gathering statistics about the core a ributes of the SPGs in our entire data set. e rst statistic we gather is the number of processes involved in each malware execution, and Figure 5 shows the results. In total, 151 of the 650 samples exhibited multi-process propagation and 67 of these samples split into two processes. is means 23.23% of all samples use multi-process propagation and 55.6% of malware that performs multi-process propagation do so in three or more processes.
e 151 samples are from 40 di erent families corresponding to 62% of all families, and Table 2 shows the complete list of families and their respective number of multi-process samples. Madangel is the only family where all samples use multi-process propagation, and we observed four families where all but one sample deployed multi-process execution, namely Emotet, Razy, Natas and TinyBanker. e maximum number of processes we observed in a single malware execution is eleven, which occurred in three samples from the Natas family and Figure 4 shows the SPG of one of these samples 1 . e malware initially transitions through three processes via les that it dropped on the system and then at a process-depth of four injects code into every process on the system for which it has permissions. e process-depths exhibited by the samples are shown in Table  3 and, in total, 91.7% of the samples have a process-depth of either one or two. is is more samples than the number of samples with 1 SHA-256 sum bd037ee28fc97f59525f384136fc067dded691230597384f04b10efe360055d1 one or two process executions (87%) con rming that some malware split execution rather than incrementally build a chain of multiprocess executions. We found a maximum process-depth of ve, and this occurred in seventeen samples. e complete list of processdepths for all 40 families with multi-process propagation is shown in Table 4 . We nd that 17 families have multiple samples with multi-process execution that do not exhibit the same process-depth, and, on the other hand, we nd that in 12 families with multiple multi-process samples all samples with multi-process execution within their respective family exhibit the same process-depth. e SPG-widths of all the samples are shown in Table 5 . In total, 597 of the samples have an SPG-width of one, which means the vast majority of samples sequentially propagate through processes. e maximum SPG-width we found was seven, and this occurred in ve malware samples, three of which belong to the Natas family, one from the Shifu family and one from the Ramnit family. We found a total of 20 families with at least one sample that has SPG-width larger than one, and the full list of these families are shown in Table  6 alongside the number of samples in each family that deploys a given SPG-width. e distribution of execution waves is shown in Table 7 . In total, 393 of 650 samples have multiple execution waves, which correspond to 60% of the samples, and we found thirteen samples that deploy more than 25 execution waves. e three highest counts of execution waves are 54, 354 and 5389, which came from samples in the Pronny, Artemis and Urausy malware families, respectively. In gure 16 we show the average number and standard deviation of execution waves per family in all families except Pronny, Artemis and Urausy, who have an average of 43, 37 and 545 execution waves, respectively, and, a standard deviation of 2, 52 and 807. We observe seven families that have no execution waves, meaning they do not deploy any dynamically generated code, and the average number of execution waves is slightly less than 15 if we discard the three families mentioned above. Additionally, the standard deviation is reasonably consistent across the majority of families, however, certain families show a considerable variation and the following families: Urausy, Artemis, Shifu, Buzus, Mira, Androm, Ursnif, Table 4 : Families with at least one sample that has processdepth higher than one. e columns indicate a given process-depth and the rows display the number of samples in a given family with the given depth. Table 6 : Families with at least one sample that has SPGwidth higher than one. e columns indicate a given SPGwidth and the rows display the number of samples in a given family that deploys the given SPG-width. Table 7 : e number of execution waves of all samples.
Symmi and VBkrypt each have a standard deviation that is larger than their respective average number of execution waves. 6 
Propagation intrinsics
We now present results related to our second research question "Are the propagation strategies used in the wild diverse?". To do this, we identify the processes that are targets of multi-process propagation, identify the API routines used by malware to propagate through the system, discuss detailed case studies of interesting malware samples, and also measure the proportion of code injections versus propagations via dropped les.
5.2.1
Target processes. Table 6 shows the names of the most targeted processes and the number of times they were used for multi-process propagation.
e most popular target is malware starting another instance of itself, in this case sample.exe. e second most popular target is explorer.exe and following this are iexplore.exe, cmd.exe and conhost.exe, which are all part of the Windows OS. In fact, the following eight Windows applications explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, conhost.exe, taskhost.exe, dwm.exe svchost.exe, and winver.exe make up 241 targets out of 394 multi-process propagations, corresponding to roughly 61%. Furthermore, if we discard the multi-process executions via sample.exe these eight applications make up 75% of the victims.
In total, we found 244 multi-process executions targeted processes with names from the Windows OS, and 150 multi-process executions with proprietary names where sample.exe takes up 74 of these. As such, there are only 76 cases where the malware execute via programs with non-standard names, corresponding to 19% of the total multi-process propagations.
In Table 12 , we show the per-family process targets as well as the number of samples in each family that execute in the given target.
e table also shows the size of the group of samples that share most target processes and the size of this group over the total samples in the family. Finally, the table shows the number of samples in the group just mentioned multiplied by the number of targets they share over the total number of propagations in the given family. We nd a total of twenty families where all samples in the given family that deploys multi-process propagation also share the largest intersection of target processes. In seventeen of these families this intersection makes up the entire set of process targets from the given family, and in the remaining three families, namely Sality, TinyBanker and Madangel, some samples also propagate to more targets. In the twenty families, however, only eleven have more than one sample that does multi-process propagation, meaning that in a total of six families with multi-process propagation all samples that propagate into multiple processes share the exact same targets. Sality is particularly interesting in that all six samples that do multi-process propagation execute within the same ve processes, whereas four of these samples also execute in rundll.exe and one also executes in sample.tmp. Gamarue is another interesting case, where all seven samples that do multi-process propagation inject into the same process, namely wuauclt.exe.
Signature diversity. Malware use a variety of Windows
APIs to propagate through the system, and we now present these by way of the process propagation signatures we created in our analysis of all the multi-process propagations. e signatures we have created are API-speci c, e.g. we consider CreateFileW and
CreateFileA to be di erent API functions. e bene t of this is to have detailed statistics, from which we can indeed build abstractions, and the drawback is that some signatures can have minor di erences to other signatures, e.g. whether the malware uses Unicode or ASCII.
We found a total of 417 injections, which is more than the 394 processes that are results of multi-process execution. e reason for this is that multiple processes may inject into the same target process, as shown in the previously discussed Natas sample in Figure 4 where multiple processes inject into the same cmd.exe process. e complete set of signatures we observed is shown in Table 13 , which is sorted by the number of times they occur. In total, we discovered 33 di erent signatures and the most common way for malware to inject into other processes is using the traditional code injection technique with API calls to OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread. is approach is used in 174 of 417 cases, corresponding to 41.7%. In contrast, we found six signatures that are only used once, and they rely mainly on a subset of the APIs from other signatures.
In general, when malware propagate through the system, it can do so by either launching a new process or migrating to an existing one. To estimate the proportion of these two we count the number of signatures that use OpenProcess, CreateProcess and ShellExecute to access the victim process, which is 211, 213 and 15, respectively. As such, there is a an almost even distribution between cases that open an existing process (OpenProcess) and launching a new process (CreateProcess and ShellExecute).
In Table 8 , we show the per-family signature usage, the number of injections that rely on a given signature and the number of samples that use the given signature. We nd 17 families that rely on a single signature and 23 families that deploy more than one signature. Sality is an interesting family in that it has a total of 41 process-propagations amongst six samples that all rely on the same signature to propagate. We observe similar trends in Dorkbot, Emotet, Natas, Ramnit, TinyBanker, VBKrypt and Vawtrak where samples extensively reuse the same signatures. We observe an opposite trend in families like Buzus, Dridex, Kovter, Kryptik, Fynloski and Ursnif that each has multiple samples performing multi-process propagation without any overlap in propagation technique. Buzus is particularly interesting in this context, where we observe two samples that combined use seven di erent injection techniques, and each of the signatures is only used once. In the following section, we will go into details with interesting injection techniques, and then in Section 5.4.2, we will present further quantitative analysis of inter-family consistency in terms of propagation signatures.
5.2.3
Interesting case studies. Injection via continuously rewriting window procedure. We observed two injections, IDs #24 and #29, that use dynamically generated code to hide the API calls involved in their respective injection. Speci cally, three malware samples from the Urausy and Buzus families repeatedly overwrite a particular memory region with code that performs a single API call in order to create a chain-like structure that results in a complete injection procedure.
e memory region is disguised as a Window procedure and called via the CallWindowProcA function.
e e ect of this is that the code responsible for the injection is constantly overwri en, remains in memory for a short time, and is Figure 6 : e processes that are the most popular targets for multi-process propagation.
never entirely represented in memory but only exposed in multiple temporal pieces. Minerva explicitly observes this by detecting a new wave of dynamically generated code whenever the malware calls CallWindowProcA. is makes it easy to detect that the memory is continuously updated because the execution waves have instructions execute in the same memory region.
Stealthy injection via ZwCreateUserProcess hooking. Another interesting code injection is ID #13 which leverages three common API calls CreateProcessA, VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, but does not have any call to functions like CreateRemoteThread or ResumeThread. In all cases where this signature occur, the target program is C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe and has dwCreationFlags set to NULL, meaning the program is not started in suspended mode. is is unusual because without a call to ResumeThread or CreateRemoteThread it is, at rst sight, unclear how the malware achieves code execution in the victim process. Instead, the malware achieves code execution in the victim process by patching the code of CreateProcessA at run time and then hijacking the Windows code that is in charge of creating a new process. It does this by hooking ZwCreateUserProcess to execute malicious code that will allocate and write memory to the target process, all nested inside the CreateProcessA call. To illustrate this, Figure 7 shows the call graph of samples that rely on this injection technique.
e hook is easy to detect given the output of Minerva from looking at the malware execution trace, shown in Figure 8 . From
CreateProcessA(victim process)
CreateProcessInternal ZwCreateUserProcess the export extractor in Minerva we know ZwCreateUserProcess is located at 0x77c46a98 and given the rst instruction is turned into a trampoline to malware code, we can easily deduce that the function is hooked. e bene t of this code injection technique is potential evasion against sandboxes and manual debuggers that only monitor CreateProcessA calls and not nested function calls. As such, if the hooking is not observed, then speci c parts of the injection will likely go unnoticed, and the threat may evade analysis.
Stealthy injection without explicit PID access. In most cases, Table 8 : e per-family list of signatures. Σ denotes the number of signatures used by a given family and |M| denotes the number of samples in a given family that deploys multi-process execution.
e rightmost column shows the speci c signatures used in each family, the number of injections that uses a given signature and the number of samples in the given family that uses this signature. the signatures rely on CreateProcess(A/W) or OpenProcess to initiate multi-process propagation. ese functions make it is easy for an analyst or sandbox to determine the target process as the output of the functions contains the PID of the process they create/open. Naturally, some injection techniques avoid these functions to hide the multi-process target, and an example of this is signature #20. Injection #20 retrieves a handle to the target process by calling GetShellWindows, opens the process using ZwOpenProcess and then continues with a familiar pa ern of functions to initiate execution. In this way, the PID of the target process is never exposed in any of the functions used in the injection, which adds a level of complexity to identifying the speci c propagation procedure. Naturally, Minerva follows the malware execution regardless of knowing the target process PID.
Code injections vs droppers.
An interesting distinction is whether a multi-process propagation is due to code injection or a dropped executable. Although these two approaches are not mutually exclusive (because a sample can drop a le, launch it and then inject code into it) it is interesting to estimate how prevalent each of them is. To give such an estimate we check for each multi-process Table 9 : e families with samples that propagate via dropped les.
e table also shows the number of samples with multi-process propagation, denoted |M |, and the unique number of samples in each family that deploys propagation via dropped les, denoted |M D |.
propagation if the target process corresponds to a le created by the malware earlier in the execution, and if so consider it to be an execution of a dropped executable. We found 52 multi-process executions where the propagation was in a created le and 342 cases where it was not the case. As such, we estimate that 13% of the multi-process executions in our data set are due to droppers, and the remaining 87% are due to code injections. We found a total of 14 malware families that had samples propagate via created les and Table 9 lists these together with the number of samples in each family that propagate in this way.
Malware activities
We now move on to the third research question "Are there clear relations between malicious behaviour and system-wide malware propagation?". is research question aims to answer how malware distributes its activities across its propagation and in this section we, therefore, focus our statistics on the 151 samples that contain multi-process execution and leave the other samples out. We limit ourselves to these because our interest is in highlighting the difference between the initial process and the non-initial processes.
e initial process refers to execution at process-depth one, and the non-initial processes refer to execution in processes with a depth greater than one.
5.3.1 Execution wave distribution. e rst aspect we analyse is where in the propagation malware deploys dynamically generated code. Speci cally, we are interested in knowing if malware continues to use dynamically generated code even a er multi-process execution. To do this, we count the number of waves in the initial process and compare it to the number of waves in non-initial processes. Amongst the 151 samples with multi-process execution, we have a total of 545 processes with malware execution, meaning 394 of these are non-initial processes. e distribution of waves in the initial process is shown in Table 9 , and the distribution of waves in non-initial processes is shown in Table 10 . We notice a clear di erence in their distributions. In non-initial processes, 220 out of 394 processes only have one execution wave and do, therefore, not produce any dynamically generated code. In contrast, only 41 samples of 151 in the initial processes have one execution wave, which corresponds to a drop from 56% in non-initial processes to 27% in initial processes. e average number of waves in the initial process is 3.39, where the average number of waves in non-initial processes is 1.64. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
5.3.2
Code-size distribution. e second aspect we consider is how much code the malware executes in each process, and then map this into the entire context of the SPG. To measure this, we collect the number of unique instructions executed in each process and then compare the initial and non-initial processes. e reason we base our measurement on unique instructions and not the total number of executed instructions is to avoid bias because of decryption loops that o en have a signi cantly larger amount of executed instructions in comparison to non-decryption loops. Figure 11 shows the number of instructions executed in the initial and non-initial processes.
e initial processes are signi cantly more dominant in terms of code size than non-initial processes with an average number of 6157 unique instructions in initial processes over 2500 in non-initial processes. e number of instructions executed in initial processes and non-initial processes of all multi-process malware.
5.3.3
Sensitive API usage. Finally, we look at the distribution of suspicious API calls in samples with multi-process execution. To do this, we generate statistics about where in the SPG malware uses API functions from four groups of sensitive Windows APIs focusing on (1) registry access; (2) internet access; (3) le-system access; and (4) security via process-privilege access. We count the unique number of functions used by the malware from these groups for each process in the SPG and Figure 12 shows the results for initial and non-initial processes.
In general, non-initial processes have signi cantly more usage of APIs related to Internet and security, are on-par with registryrelated APIs, but uses less APIs related to the le system. We found 89 non-initial processes call ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptor, which is the most common call from this group, and only six initial processes call this function. We also observe 60 non-initial processes that use InitializeSecurityDescriptor, 60 processes that use SetSecurityDescriptorDacl and 58 processes that use GetSecurityDescriptorSacl. All of these functions provide features to change security descriptors of a given process, which is used for process-level privilege elevation. As such, malware is far more likely to initiate privilege escalation techniques in non-initial processes than in the initial process.
In parallel to security sensitive APIs, we see eight times more usage of Internet-related APIs in non-initial processes than in initial processes. In non-initial processes, we saw a total of 59 processes using the WSAStartup function, which initialises the Windows socket library (WS2 32.dll) and is the highest level of abstraction for working with Windows sockets. e next most popular Internet-related functions are InternetOpen (27 processes), HttpOpenRequest (22 processes) and InternetConnect (22 processes). In contrast, in initial processes, we only saw 11 use WSAStartup and zero usage of the other functions.
In Table 10 , we show the number of samples in each family that uses functions from the four sensitive API-groups. e trends from viewing all the samples as a whole follow, and we clearly observe that families most o en use Internet and security APIs in non-initial processes. In total, 29 families use Internet-related APIs in non-initial processes whereas only 6 families use them in initial processes, and 18 families use security-related APIs in non-initial processes whereas only seven families use them in initial processes. Roughly half of all samples with multi-process propagation use Internet-related APIs in their non-initial process and a li le less than a third uses security-related APIs. is is far more than the usage in initial processes, which is about 7% for both API groups. We observe slightly more usage of registry-related APIs in noninitial processes and the usage of le system APIs is practically the same between initial and non-initial processes. -init  Init  Non-init  Init  Non-init  Init  Non-init  Androm  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  Barys  1  1  1  1  1  1  Bitman  1  1  1  Buzus  2  2  1  2  2  2  CTBLocker  3  3  3  3  3  3  Cerber  1  1  1  1  1  1  CoinMiner  5  2  4  5  5  1  Crowti  2  1  1  2  2  Cutwail  2  2  2  2  Dorkbot  3  2  2  3  2  Dridex  3  2  2  1 Urausy  4  4  1  4  4  4  Ursnif  3  2  2  3  3  2  3  VBKrypt  2  2  2  2  Vawtrak  4  1  4  3  4  4  3  4  Waski  1  1  1  1  1  Zbot  3  2  1  3  3  3  2  Total  151  11  73  63  87  136  133  10  46   Table 10 : e amount of samples per family that use sensitive functions exposed by the Windows API. e table lists all four categories of sensitive API groups and the amount samples that use these in initial and non-initial processes, respectively.
Propagation evolution and inter-family characteristics
We now move on to the fourth and nal research question "Has system-wide malware executions changed consistently towards one direction and are there any clear inter-family SPG consistency". To answer this question, we rst gather statistics about the yearly average of processes involved in malware execution and identify when speci c propagation techniques were rst used. Following this, we gather statics about inter-family consistency regarding multi-process execution and propagation techniques.
5.4.1 Propagation evolution. e yearly average and the standard deviation of processes involved in each malware execution are shown in Figure 13 . e average number of processes uctuates, and there is no clear sign towards a steady increase nor decrease.
ere is roughly an even distribution between the number of processes over the years, and the overall average is 1.61.
Next, we investigate how the multi-process propagation techniques have evolved by correlating the speci c signatures we developed to recognise multi-process propagation in Section 5.2.2 to when they were rst used. e number of unique signatures found each year and the number of families in our data set for each year are shown in Figure 14 . In general, we observe a steady usage of signatures ranging from seven at the lowest (2018) to fourteen at the highest (2017). In Figure 15 , we show the number of signatures that were discovered a given year, and, interestingly, we observe that the number of novel propagation techniques is steadily decreasing. is decrease shows clearly in that 25 out of 33 injection signatures were rst used in 2012, 2013 and 2014, which amounts to 75% of all injections being invented before 2015. 
5.4.2
Inter-family propagation characteristics. roughout this paper, we have explored various family-related aspects of systemwide malware execution, and we now continue in this domain by giving a more general assessment of inter-family consistency using several relevant metrics. We continue with our de nitions from earlier and denote the number of samples in each family as |S| and the number of samples that perform multi-process propagation as |M|.
e rst consistency measurement we determine is whether families are stable in terms of multi-process propagation. To do this, we compute the maximum number of samples in each family that either perform multi-process propagation or stays in the same process over the total amount of samples, given as
. is is shown in the fourth column from the le in Table 11 , and we nd an overall consistency average of 0.86. We do the same check but restricted to the data set of families with samples that do multi-process propagation, i.e.
|M | |S |
for families with |M | 0, and the result is shown in the h le -most column in Table 11 . e overall average decreases by 0.48 to 0.38. is is unexpected since it shows there is li le consistency in the number of samples that perform system-wide propagation within malware families where at least one sample performs multi-process propagation.
Next, we consider the number of unique signatures deployed in each malware family, which we denote Σ. We observe an average of 2.7 di erent signatures in malware families that have multi-process propagating samples, as shown in the sixth column from the le in Table 11 . Another interesting measurement is the consistency only between the malware samples that perform multi-process propagation. To quantify this, we count the number of samples in each family that has the same set of propagation signatures, and we call this Σ eq . For families with multi-process propagation, the average number of samples with the same set of signatures is 2.62. To measure the inter-family consistency we then divide Σ eq with the number of propagating samples from each family, given as
and this is shown in the second column from the right. Here, we see an overall average of 0.73, meaning 73% of samples in families with propagating samples have the same set of signatures.
Finally, we look at consistency based on the maximum number of samples with similar signatures and the number of samples without multi-process propagation, given as S eq = max(Σ eq , |S| − |M|).
From S eq we then calculate S eq | S | to get a consistency measurement on the entire family based on samples with the same set of signatures or no signatures at all. On average, we see a 0.83 consistency as shown in the rightmost column of Table 11 .
is shows that 83% of samples in each family either has the same set of signatures for multi-process propagation, or no samples in the family have multi-process propagation at all. We found no families that have multi-process propagation to have a perfect score in this context.
DISCUSSION
We now give answers to our research questions, discuss the results in more depth and also discuss the limitations of our study. We present our discussion in chronological order of the research questions.
Answers to research questions
Research question 1. Is system-wide malware propagation prevalent? Yes! We nd that 23.23% of samples perform multi-process propagation, showing that almost a quarter of malware samples rely on hostbased propagation. In contrast, PaloAlto reports that 13.5% [26] of malware samples in 2013 contain code injections and Ugarte et al. [33] report that 15.6% samples (1,213 of 7,729) contain multi-process execution in a data set spanning mid-2007 to mid-2014. We believe the main reason for this is that our system is more general and captures multi-process execution that previous work miss. Another possibility for di erent results is data set di erence, in that Ugarte et al. rely on samples that are older than ours.
System-wide malware propagation is not only prevalent in terms of multi-process propagation but also the number of dynamically generated execution waves. We nd that 60% of all samples have multiple execution waves, meaning they deploy some form of dynamically generated code. In contrast, Ugarte et al. [33] found 78.7% (6088 out of 7729 samples), Codisasm [9] reports 68% and Kang et al. [21] report 98% (367 out of 374). Interestingly, we report the lowest number since our model is generic in terms of system-wide malware execution. However, our model also distinguishes malicious and benign code execution more precisely, and we suspect this to be the main reason. Previous work unreasonably over-approximates some aspects of the execution, e.g. capture dynamically generated code by any code in a process with malware code executing and these over-approximations may capture non-malicious execution waves where we are highly resistant to this.
System-wide malware propagation has also been prevalent for many years, showing that indeed this is not a new issue. We observe a steady use of multi-process propagation throughout our entire data set, spanning 2012-2018, and we nd that 40 out of a total 65 families use multi-process propagation, which is roughly two-thirds of the families in our data set. As such, system-wide propagation is prevalent not only in the number of total samples but also in the majority of families.
Research question 2. Are the propagation strategies used in the wild diverse? Yes! We nd that there is a range of 2 to 11 processes in which malware with system-wide propagation execute. As such, there is a signicant di erence directly in the number of processes, although 85% of samples with multi-process execution execute in either two or three processes. In addition to this, there is also a broad range of execution waves deployed by malware samples, with the majority ranging between two and 25 execution waves. We nd only 13 samples with more than 25 execution waves. Previous work also reports a diversity in the number of process executions and the number of execution waves [9, 12, 21, 33] .
Furthermore, we also observe diversity in process-depth, wavedepth and SPG-width. We see a maximum process-depth of ve processes and a maximum SPG-width of seven processes. is means we see several malware samples that both spread out across several processes and also perform their system-wide propagation in a chain-like fashion.
One of the areas that show signi cant diversity in propagation strategy is the speci c techniques malware use to propagate across processes. We nd a total of 33 di erent propagation techniques, and most of these have less than ten samples using the given technique. However, many of the more rarely-seen techniques are derivatives of popular techniques. ese are derivatives in various ways such as using hooking to rely on only a subset of the standard APIs. In addition to this, there is also an even distribution between propagations that inject code into existing processes and propagations that create new processes.
Interestingly, we also nd that malware with samples that do system-wide propagation use on average 2.6 di erent propagation techniques. is also means there is diversity within the SPG of each malware sample, in the speci c way they propagate through the system.
We also observe that initial processes execute more code than non-initial processes. On average, the initial processes execute about three times more unique instructions than non-initial processes. Furthermore, the set of processes that malware target to perform multi-process propagation is mainly divided between a small number of standard Windows applications.
Research question 3. Are there clear relations between malicious behaviour and system-wide malware propagation? Yes! Two key observations provide arguments for the answer to our third research question. First, the number of execution waves in the initial process signi cantly outnumbers the number of execution waves in non-initial processes. In total, 73% of samples that deploy multi-process propagation use dynamically generated code in their initial process where the gure is 44% for processes that are a result of multi-process propagation. As such, dynamically generated code is a technique that is mostly used in the initial process but occurs in almost half of the non-initial processes.
Second, the use of sensitive API calls is a central feature that distinguishes code in the initial process and code in non-initial Table 11 : Inter-family malware propagation characteristics.
14 processes. We nd far more usage of security-related APIs and Internet-related APIs in non-initial processes. is makes sense because malware uses propagation techniques, including dynamically generated code and multi-process propagation, to hide the malicious code and make the analysis of it more complicated. In addition to this, it makes sense that sensitive API calls are mainly called in non-initial processes because a large number of targets are benign Windows programs where sensitive API calls are considered less suspicious.
Research question 4. Has system-wide malware executions changed consistently towards one direction and are there any clear inter-family SPG consistency? We nd no evidence of consistent changes over the years, and for families, we nd areas of both interfamily consistency and diversity! We nd no clear evidence that the use of system-wide propagation in malware is increasing nor decreasing but rather observe a uctuating trend. Speci cally, there is no increase in either the number of processes used by malware or execution waves and there is no increase in the number of novel API pa erns used to propagate to multiple processes. We nd that there is a constant diversity amongst signatures used every year, but that the number of unique signatures invented is steadily decreasing.
From a high-level perspective, we nd several metrics that show inter-family consistency. We nd that 86% of samples in each family either propagate or do not propagate and, closely related, we nd that 83% of samples in each family follow one direction of either not deploying any system-wide propagation or implementing the same set of propagation approaches. Additionally, In 17 out of 40 families with multi-process execution, we nd that the targets of the multi-process samples of each family are the same, albeit it is only six of these families that have multiple multi-process samples. In terms of propagation strategy, we nd that for families with multi-process execution an average of 73% of the samples use the same APIs to propagate through the system, and we nd several families where the samples in the respective family propagate using a single signature. Furthermore, we nd that in 27 out of 31 families that use Internet-related APIs the samples of each family purely use functions from the API via initial or non-initial processes, meaning the samples in each family consistently use Internet-related APIs in the same way. We nd a somewhat similar trend with APIs related to process-level privileges where samples from 12 families, out of a total 17, exclusively use the API from either initial or non-initial processes, albeit, 8 of these only have a single sample using the security-related APIs.
However, we also observe several metrics that show signs of inter-family diversity. For example, in the 40 families that have samples with multi-process execution, we nd an inter-family average of 38% samples exhibiting multi-process execution. Furthermore, it is only in one family where all samples deploy multi-process propagation and only in 10 families that more than half of the samples deploy multi-process execution. Additionally, we nd a signi cant variation in 9 out of all 65 families in terms of the number of execution waves deployed by the samples of the respective families, in that the standard deviation is larger than the average number of execution waves. Similarly, we nd that 17 out of 40 families with multi-process execution have varying levels of process-depths, meaning the samples in each family deploy diverse propagation strategies.
Limitations
e main limitation of our study is that we execute the samples under one speci c se ing. To get broader insights about malware propagation we can leverage the use of di erential studies, by analysing the malware under di erent contexts, similar to Cozzi et al. [10] . For example, we set the recording time to 25 seconds, and we did not perform any user stimulation. Increasing the recording time is likely to produce interesting results, and supplying user stimulation can trigger more behaviours in some types of malware. Another promising avenue is changing parameters in the execution environment, such as the state of the guest machine. For example, we used a vanilla Windows 7 with no processes running except for the standard Windows applications. However, some malware samples rely on injecting into speci c processes, such as web browsers, and the state of our guest machine does not enable this behaviour. By providing a more realistic setup, we may gather more resourceful results. In addition to this, we could also collect more comprehensive statistics by extending Minerva to support 64-bit architectures, as some malware samples are observed to deploy exotic propagation techniques only on this architecture [7] .
RELATED WORK
Large-scale dynamic analysis studies. ere are several existing studies based on large-scale dynamic analysis of malware. Bayer et al. performed a study [5] on samples from early 2007 to late 2008 based on their Anubis malware analysis platform. eir data set is based on submissions to their web portal, and they investigate various aspects such as le system, network and registry activity as well as botnet activity and sandbox detection. Ugarte et al. [33] presents a large-scale study on packers based on an analysis platform build on top of TEMU. However, their system is not as general as Minerva in terms of capturing system-wide malware execution [24] and their works is largely focused on creating a packer taxonomy and analysing their data set in relation to this taxonomy. Severi at al. presents the Malrec malware analysis system [31] , which is also based on the PANDA instrumentation environment, and their study incorporates 66,301 samples spread over 1,270 families as identi ed by AVClass [30] . ey rst perform a study on how much malware modify kernel code as a means of detecting privilege escalation and then performed a study on malware classi cation.
Other large-scale malware analysis studies. Plohmann et al. present the Malpedia platform [28] , which is a collaborative e ort to gather samples and structure the malware landscape. ey collect a corpus of 1800 malware samples spanning 600 families and have manually unpacked many of them. Based on the data set, they perform a study on various elements collected through static analysis such as the PE headers, control-ow analysis and API usage. Although the majority of large-scale studies focus on Windows malware, there is some work about other operating systems and architectures. A recent study by Cozzi et al. [11] performs a comprehensive investigation into Linux malware. e authors collect a data set of 10,548 Linux malware samples for more than 15 eight di erent architectures and study several aspects like ELF header manipulation, persistence, deception, privilege escalation and process interactions. e growing number of Android and mobile phones have also motivated several large-scale studies for malware on the Android platform [15, 32, 34, 36] .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we performed a large-scale analysis of malware in the wild, spanning 650 samples and 65 di erent families. Our study focused on the three aspects of system-wide malware propagation: (1) prevalence and diversity; (2) relationship to malicious behaviours; and (3) evolution and inter-family consistency.
We collected vast amounts of statistics to derive insights about malware propagation and discussed our results in detail. We found that system-wide propagation is prevalent and diverse amongst malware samples. We found clear relationships between propagation and malware behaviours and found mixed signals in terms of inter-family consistency. Surprisingly we did not see any increase in malware propagation through the years but instead observed a steady and consistent use.
e results of our study show that we can use a carefully selected data set to derive a high-level view of malware propagation, albeit this view can be blurry in places. We used this high-level view to identify key characteristics of malware propagation that have implications for existing work and also opens opportunities for new research avenues. 
